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I. Introduction
From the 1940s to the 1970s, the world witnessed considerable and 
tumultuous change. This change was, on the one hand, based on the 
independence realized by the territories that European empires had 
controlled during the colonial era. On the other hand, just as the strug-
gle against colonial rule ended, new conflicts erupted in many of these 
newly independent nations. In contrast to the colonial era, after the cul-
mination of the Cold War, which reshaped the world order, the number 
of newly independent states unable to fulfill their obligations to their 
citizens increased. Such failures became apparent as states failed to 
provide a certain level of functions that would ensure both the security 
and the well-being of their respective populations. Although such cri-
ses of statehood are often depicted as mainly internal in nature,1 their 
roots and ramifications transcend the intrastate and are often ignored 
in the literature.
While there was an increase in violence, some scholars attempted 
to identify the reasons underlying the failure of such states to perform 
key functions. In doing so, the debate was joined by a body of litera-
ture that offered the common assumption that these conflicts usually 
come under a state’s failure.2 The “failed state” notion became promi-
nent among people in diplomatic, political, and academic circles, as 
it gradually became rooted in the literature. While in the beginning 
it concentrated on states within Africa, the label was embraced as an 
international concern in the aftermath of the “9/11” terror attacks on 
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the twin towers in New York City. As a result, failed states were seen 
as a threat to international security since such states could potentially 
offer a safe haven to terrorist organizations.
Although virtually no one disagrees that the majority of supposed 
failed states suffer many severe political, security, and socioeconomic 
challenges, the failed-state thesis has come up short in sufficiently 
elucidating the development of such obstacles. Furthermore, there is 
a lack of clarity and much disagreement, often governed by subjec-
tive interpretations, in the academic and policy discourse over how to 
define the concept and when and how it should be used.
This brief essay acts as a beginning critique of the failed-states dis-
course and thought. The intention is to highlight the problems associ-
ated with the current debates. It is not the aim here to present a new 
approach. The essay will begin with a quick analysis of the theoreti-
cal-cum-policy debates underpinning state failure. Thereafter, observa-
tion will be made on the apparent growing international security and 
political interest in the state-failure thesis, with particular reference to 
the recently emerging pathology of terrorism and its implications for 
those countries labelled as failed.
II. Failed States
A. Defining Failure
The so-called “failed state” as an approach became prominent at 
the beginning of the 1990s, in both academic and policy discourses. 
From this period onward, the work published by Helman and Ratner, 
entitled Saving Failed States, which emerged from a paradox during 
the Cold War, reflects this.3 As noted by Pedersen and colleagues, the 
failed-state concept still continues to enjoy widespread popularity for 
denoting a situation in which the governmental infrastructure of the 
state has collapsed to a serious extent.4 Although there is no single or 
commonly agreed upon definition of what constitutes a failed state, the 
prevailing literature indicates a certain consensus among existing defi-
nitions. Those nations that are perceived to comprise such a category 
are viewed as suffering from, or facing the risk of, acute instability. The 
increasing focus on the failed-state concept revolves around the notion 
that states currently face certain threats, not solely from other nations, 
but also from manifold transatlantic threats which stem from states as 
well as less powerful actors who have their origins in state failure.
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Most of the failed-state discourses are centered on the lack of a 
state’s capacity to carry out the basic services for which it is responsible, 
such as ensuring peace and stability, the rule of law, good governance, 
effective border control against external threats, and economic growth 
and sustainability. According to Zartman, state failure goes beyond 
revolt, coup, or protest. It refers to a situation in which a state’s struc-
ture, authority, law, and political order have collapsed and need to be 
reconstituted in some way.5 Therefore, failure at the state level occurs if 
various structures, authority, power, laws, and the political order col-
lapse. The political vacuum that occurs after state failure encourages 
non-state actors to take charge of the different roles of the state, leaving 
behind the actors (i.e., civil society) that are unable to rebound or fill 
the vacuum.6 The concept is associated not only with collapse, but also 
as a process in which the state fails to meet its responsibilities due to a 
gradual decline in its capacity. As Rotberg delineates it, the failing and 
lack of capacity are rooted in the rational choices made by politicians 
over time.7
B. Contradictory Interpretations
The literature focusing on failed states has a number of serious flaws. 
According to Doornbos, not only does it have too many unclear defi-
nitions, but also the perceived causes as well as outcomes of the label 
seem to be blurred.8 As stated by Woodward, there are additional com-
plications due to the fact that the state-failure concept attempts to rep-
resent the convergence of humanitarian, human rights, development, 
and security issues, though the label holds different interpretations 
with regard to these terms.9 Such problems can perhaps be attributed 
to the fact that a major part of the existing literature on this issue 
comes from government-financed research institutions as well as think 
tanks. In most cases, these entities work separately from academic 
institutions. As noted by Hameiri, with regard to their interpretation 
or understanding of this approach, not all these perspectives share 
common ground, and additionally they seem to be talking over each 
other.10
According to Woodward, a clear definition of this concept is absent, 
which could open up the possibility to analyze it empirically.11 The way 
the term is defined in the literature is not only vague but also offers a 
range of characteristics as well as assumed consequences. Numerous 
observers, as well as projects which are to some extent politically ori-
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ented within the literature, have focused on formulating indicators 
that are perceived to be logical and supposed to be broadly shared by 
failed states. The assumption is that one or more such indicators can 
be seen in those states. The suggestion is that the label failed state is 
self-evident and applied to particular cases. The condition of one state 
compared to the next among such states, however diverse they might 
be, is considered to be evidence of what is left relatively unexplained. 
As identified by Call, researchers have frequently focused on apply-
ing a single solution to states where “symptoms” range from poverty 
to internal conflict, expecting that such a solution would be able to 
resolve all problems.12
Rotberg has identified various political variables that influence the 
level of weakness or failure in a state.13 The main defining character-
istic typifying state failure is deeply rooted politicized conflict, which 
is broadly aimed at the political center or some form of governmen-
tal authority. The argument is that prolonged political conflict occurs 
over a prolonged period of time. Hence, during this period, the state 
cannot entirely secure its territory and thus conflict becomes the only 
form of acceptable interaction among and between armed belligerents. 
Somalia, for instance, has broadly been a continuous theatre of politi-
cally orchestrated tensions and conflicts, particularly for the past thirty 
years.
The different forms of political conflict that have afflicted south 
Somalia, for example, over the past twenty years are not problems 
that are unique to the region. Rather, they are a reflection of the wider 
dimensions of political conflict and the serious obstacles to rehabilitat-
ing and reconstructing a brutally battered and fragile state which has 
repeatedly failed its society.14 Given that various political and theo-
retical debates have evidently been closely linked to this concept, it is 
important to remember at this point that this way of depicting states 
is politically driven, rather than being objectively and empirically 
driven.
C. External Actors
The biggest problem with the failed-states thesis is that it completely 
ignores any external factors that might have contributed to the sup-
posed failure and does not view conflict within these states as conflicts 
between legitimate factions in the political sphere. Rather, it sees these 
as turmoil that impartial third-party actors can solve with their poli-
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cies. For instance, the constant pressure to rebuild central state institu-
tions has been labelled as perpetuating the “sickness” in countries like 
Somalia. It is said that such a tendency towards central state-building 
is a clear result of the myopia induced by the state-failure discourse. 
There is an inherent aura of finality with regard to “failure.” It assumes 
that a state has reached its nadir and lies at its lowest ebb.15
It similarly depicts countries like Somalia as a blank canvas, where-
upon new institutions can be imposed because of the absence of exist-
ing governance structures. However, current and past situations in 
countries like Somalia have never been static, as there is a persistent 
oscillation between worse and better, contrary to what a “failed state” 
suggests. Likewise, Somalia is not in a state of blankness, but rather of 
political absence. It has a vibrant communications network. Its people 
exist within an inter-subjectivity in which society is present.
The problem with the failed-states discourse is that it presents a 
narrow historical account of the fragility of such states. It does this by 
concentrating entirely on the state’s failure, and hence glosses over the 
historical processes that may have brought about such failure. Accord-
ing to Gourevitch, these processes include the inheritance from colo-
nial rulers, interventions by powerful states after the Cold War, and 
the legacy of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 
relation to their economic interventions (i.e., the structural adjustment 
programmes).16 The failed-states thesis primarily sidelines all external 
stakeholders and places the responsibility of failure entirely on the 
shoulders of the domestic environment.
It assumes that the state is completely responsible for its own failure 
and thus disregards all external entities that may be party responsible. 
Arguably, this would be misleading, because the idea of assuming the 
state to be a remote entity that is entirely responsible for what takes 
place within its borders is very simplistic. Consider the degree of glo-
balization in today’s world and how nations are gradually finding 
themselves entangled in intercontinental structures, which include, 
among others, foreign economic agents and the aid systems to which 
they become accountable.17 In other words, the choices that such states 
make are not solely finalized by their regimes, but also by a wide range 
of other transoceanic actors.
Comprehending the external influences by questioning who cur-
rently uses the language of failed states and who it actually serves is 
crucial. The state-failure discourse goes back to the Westphalian ideal 
of statehood.18 In other words, as noted by Haldén, it has its roots 
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in the Global North and has been utilized in Western academic and 
political discourse in order to influence the affairs of state in the Global 
South.19 Since this concept has its roots in Western academic, security, 
and policy discourses, the language used might be significant when 
it comes to understanding Western ideas of “failed others” and “suc-
cessful us.” The study Orientalism, by Edward Saïd, a pioneering effort 
in the making of Post-Colonial Studies, suggests that failure could be 
expanded in order to reinforce the misleading cultural assumptions of 
the “Western world,” facilitating the misrepresentation and distancing 
of the “oriental other.”20
As a foundation for policy, the concept might have some serious 
limitations, specifically due to the fact that it reflects the interests of 
those who adopt it. Such interests may conflict with the interests of 
those to whom it refers.21 Certainly, exclusive locally based conno-
tations of responsibility exonerate Western countries, multinational 
organizations, and the international financial institutions they control, 
with regard to whatever actions these actors may have carried out that 
contributed to the so-called failure by the state concerned. Likewise, 
such actors do not face the prospect of intrusive policy institutions that 
strive to stop whatever policies they may prosecute that could lead to 
state collapse.
The failed-states thesis has much to do with expectations based on 
modern statehood and the various functions that a state is expected to 
fulfill.22 While these scholars are right to identify the ideological facets 
related to the representation of state failure, the problem with their 
interpretation is that they fail to recognize that the expectations or 
functions have in fact changed dramatically over time, consistent with 
the role of the state, which has changed in the context of international 
economy and security. The failed-state literature is flawed simply 
because it usually paints an image of a state that has apparently failed 
in a uniform fashion,23 as such failure will be extremely uneven in a 
state the size of Somalia. In spite of the fragility of this state, political 
conflict in the south-central part of the country means something com-
pletely different compared to the northern part, Somaliland. Hence, 
the levels or degrees of violence are very different. Furthermore, those 
who are responsible for such violence, and their motives, are also dif-
ferent.
According to Coyne and Leeson, the collapse of governments, such 
as the one in Somalia, are not only the result of how poorly they were 
designed and run, but also due to the fact that existing informal insti-
Bildhaan  Vol. 14
84
tutions, known in Somalia as “Xeer,” have been at odds with the formal 
institutions that were adopted.24 The consequence became an inherent 
dysfunction across a wide arc of governance. This amplifies the reasons 
why there have been unsuccessful interventions carried out by foreign 
powers to create new formal institutions with a central government.
III. Security and Political Implications
A. The Politics/Security Nature of Failed States
At the core, intellectual penury is linguistic in nature. The propen-
sity of traditional policymakers is to separate politics from security, 
thus depriving themselves of the vocabulary needed to analyze the 
terms and the problems faced. The consequences are flawed assump-
tions: that conflict has taken a considerable leap into anarchy and that 
the source of the supposed threats come from tates that are labelled 
failed. These breed confusion over operational and strategic concepts. 
The idea that conflicts in today’s world are profoundly more complex 
and dangerous has been frequently echoed by international security 
experts and has become received wisdom.25 Thus, it is hard to reject 
the claim that decisive change has occurred.
For instance, the growth of globalization, urbanization, technologi-
cal improvement, the increase of global threats, and the empowerment 
of non-state actors are certainly complex issues that have changed the 
international policy and security environments.26 It is befitting and just 
that many policymakers and researchers have labored to conceptualize 
changes in the international system and their implications for interna-
tional security. However, though the world has become more complex, 
violence and uncertainties have at all times been significant features of 
the subjective often associated with the failed-state paradigm.
In the United States, the international security policy of 2002 seems 
to indicate two differing security conditions, which developed along 
with the ever-expanding issue of globalization since the culmination 
of the Cold War. The 2002 policy of the U.S. in relation to interna-
tional security states that the attacks carried out by terrorist groups 
prompted the U.S. to focus sharply on its position as the only world 
superpower, the threats from extremists, and the simmering violence 
that has erupted since the peaceful end to the Cold War.27
The view that weak or failing states are a key threat in today’s world 
indicates an ideational shift in the development of threats in two ways. 
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First, it identifies a change in terms of what is seen as an international 
security threat. From a realist perspective, states gain security from 
striking a balance with other more powerful ones, just as America 
did during the Cold War and European states did prior to World War 
I. According to Sørensen, for a powerful state to view a weak state 
as a threat to its security is vague in terms of a realist view.28 Hence, 
the diminishment of security dilemmas has led insecurity dilemmas 
to become the new core concern. As stated by Manjikian, this can be 
observed in the institutionalization of so-called failing states.29 Terror-
ism or extremism is diagnosed as a mental disorder, in which failed 
states are the bodies and the U.S. is the cure.
Therefore, states whose condition is deteriorating have no sover-
eignty as they are not part of the decision-making process, just as 
patients do not make their own diagnosis or prescribe their own med-
ication. Such top-down (often expressed through medical analogy) 
approaches often ignore the target beneficiaries’ real needs and the 
absence of ownership, which is crucial for the long-term stability of 
these countries. Second, broader change comes from the fact that the 
threat from failed states does not derive from the government or politi-
cal leaders, but rather from actors who operate freely within such 
states.30
These non-state actors are not included in the classical theories of 
International Relations. The threats from failed states do not mean an 
end to the differences among domestic and international affairs that 
have been significant since the Peace of Westphalia and the idea of sov-
ereignty. From a Westphalian perspective, a threat is perceived from a 
state-centric military standpoint. Internationally, security respects ter-
ritorial sovereignty as well as the integrity of legitimately independent 
and supposedly equal nation-states—a milieu characterized by coop-
eration and conflicts among such nations in an anarchic environment.31 
This may perhaps reflect the pluralist norms of interactions in diplo-
matic and multilateral terms. In spite of the differences in interpretation 
among, for instance, liberal and realist visionaries of the international 
system, the way in which threats to security have been perceived and 
tackled has largely relied on such statist, pluralist ontology. In today’s 
world, the idea that international security risks stem from failed states 
is widely adopted. Numerous researchers and political observers have 
focused on the risks that are inherent in such states. In accordance with 
such arguments, from a conventional Westphalian perspective of inter-
national security, threats arise from powerful aggressive states.
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B. The Securitization of the Ungoverned: An Interventionist 
Mechanism
There is a strong belief that the label failed state is used primarily to 
legitimize potential military and other interventions, which largely 
benefit those who are doing the intervening. Today, the new ideologi-
cal feature of “humanitarian intervention” has had an impact on inter-
national relations theory. Even staunch pacifists who are not in favor of 
foreign interventions often support such activities, with the caveat that 
all forces applied are humanitarian in their focus.32 Apparently, in this 
post-Cold War period, world powers make use of their military force 
not as an expression of realpolitik, but as a technology to reinstate 
good governance, eradicate famine, and safeguard vulnerable com-
munities.33
Human security presently requires comprehension of a global envi-
ronment in which the strategic concern of states in the Global North 
have been overlaid with more diffuse threats that are linked to the 
collapse and insurgency stemming from the marginalized people of 
the Global South.34 The possibility for people in the northern hemi-
sphere to enjoy their lives is no longer exclusively a local matter since 
becoming part of the international political agenda. Securing life for 
citizens, for their benefit, has in recent times become an objective of 
policy interest. Human security, in this context, appears to require an 
enlightened perspective which expands security concerns outside the 
state-to-state war to include such threats to life as pandemics, displace-
ment, and pollution.35
Despite this, the grounds on which there is intervention in the affairs 
of so-called failed states is often based on the pretext that their lawless 
condition threatens international security. As stated by Akpinarli, this 
label has been adopted and developed by external actors, presumably 
to fix the problems of these countries.36 Hence, such actors advocate 
and justify military intervention in order to safeguard the supposed 
security.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the failed-state label actually 
brings more problems than it fixes—not only with regard to military 
intervention but also by keeping such states on the margins of inter-
national relationships. In fact, it is not misleading to suggest that the 
term failed state is a clear case of what is called securitization, which is 
based on the assumptions of the Copenhagen School of Security. As stated 
by Buzan and colleagues, those who developed this approach suggest 
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that a discourse that adopts a way of offering something to deal with 
an existential threat to the referent object does not produce securitiza-
tion.37 They state that an issue is securitized if, and only if, the audi-
ence, who are the ordinary citizens in the North, accept the label of 
failed state. In this instance, the mainstream media and large corpora-
tions who work with, in, or for failed states act as agents for securitiz-
ing actors.
1. Failed States and Terrorism Nexus
According to authors such as Helman and Ratner38 and Raeymakers,39 
the strategic impact of a failed state has shifted from being a local to an 
international threat. The United States sees such a state as a real secu-
rity threat. A proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, expan-
sion of networks used by criminals, along with those offering a safe 
haven to terror groups,40 creates a source of serious threats. The result 
is that spheres of international security have become entwined and 
political policies are constructed to implement security policy. This 
securitization of failed states has come under growing criticism since 
the assumption that failed states breed extremism is disputed. Thus, 
the situation is deemed not as simple as construed by policy gurus and 
general assumptions by Western powers. On the other hand, tradition-
alists claim that the term security has gradually become stretched too 
far by including all political matters, in the process becoming devoid of 
all meaning and analytical significance through indiscriminate appli-
cation.41
The observation that failed states pose a threat to international secu-
rity is an eminently reasonable one; however, this must be qualified by 
the secondary observation that failed states in themselves do not nec-
essarily generate threats. Connecting the concept to extremism is easy 
to do as it clusters all such states together and puts them under the 
failed-states discourse umbrella.42 Therefore, the association between 
state weakness or failure with international terrorism is very complex 
and more tenuous than is generally assumed. The idea that all the 
states that have been labelled as failures are characterized and afflicted 
by terrorism is unsubstantiated. In fact, the majority of states dubbed 
as the least developed by the United Nations do not have any terror-
ism activities.43
Current challenges relating to insurgents and terrorism have also 
broken the carefully constructed, but unsustainable, binary between 
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international security and politics. It is tempting to assign this cogni-
tive dissonance to the maxim that insurgence and terror are prodigious 
and political forms of warfare.44 However, this often-held perception 
ignores the immensely political character of conventional engagements. 
It might be more accurate to suggest that conflicts against non-state 
powers put the political dimensions of conflicts into a clearer perspec-
tive, and in doing so reveal some of the flaws of the techno-scientific 
rationale. Due to the underdevelopment of political vocabulary, the 
main emphasis is on the capabilities and crimes of international ter-
rorist and insurgent groups, but little on their goals, beliefs, strategic 
cultures, and motives.45 Although capabilities are significant, the aims 
and motives determine the contexts in which they are called upon. For 
example, the consensus about states labelled as failed is confined to 
the observation that terror groups occupy ungoverned regions and use 
them to plan their attacks.
But none of the powerful countries, especially the United States, 
have the resources to project power into every ungoverned region. 
In fact, doing so would not be effective in an environment in which 
such groups can successfully plan and organize attacks while living 
in orderly, Western, urban environments.46 The fact is that many such 
terrorist acts are internal in nature, driven by grievances stemming 
from political or national struggles. A clear example of this is Sri Lan-
ka’s Tamil Tigers.47 As Bilgin and Morton state, the state-failure dis-
course permits particular political agendas that only help the political 
and security benefits of the ones who use it. Hence, the label failed 
state, and the discourses related to it, is not neutral but developed by 
certain governments to forward their own political agendas. Further-
more, researchers like Von Hippel have suggested that some states that 
come under this label will be deemed to be Orwell’s Animal Farm.48 For 
instance, if authoritarian regimes maintain their grip over the mecha-
nisms of their states, they will not fail. An example of this is perhaps 
Saudi Arabia. Other cases, such as Pakistan, do however attract terror-
ism, as stated by Patrick, who suggests that the failed-state discourse 
is specifically applied to states that powerful Northern governments 
think should be labelled in this way.49 The results of categorizing some 
states as failed can currently be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. 
However, such labelling is itself not always accurate. But this inac-
curacy can allow those Northern powers to justify a democratization 
drive in the guise of humanitarian interventions and countering and 
preventing terror. According to Patrick, the democratic peace concept 
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is promoted by those who justify democratization in the context of the 
so-called war on terror.50 Others, such as Logan and Preble, consider 
that states in the Global North, particularly the United States, often 
arbitrarily link terrorist actions to a very broad and generalized defini-
tion of state failure so as to justify the war on terror.51
Empirical data on failed states are said to have shown that state 
failure rarely translates into a security threat to the international com-
munity. Hence, this is the reason why some have suggested that states 
in the North are guilty of “strategic overkill” in terms of the way the 
international security threat arising from failed states is exaggerated. 
This strategic overkill depends on a generalized definition of failed 
states instead of an in-depth assessment of the unique dynamics based 
on politics, culture, and economics that exist in such environments.52 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that theorists on this issue 
are entirely responsible for the obvious ideological misuse of this ana-
lytical implementation by Northern politicians, just as it would be 
unreasonable to hold Karl Marx’s ideas responsible for the wrongdo-
ing of Joseph Stalin. However, in spite of this, many conceptual weak-
nesses have been recognized by critics of the failed-states framework.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This article has briefly pointed out some of the complexities of the 
failed-state paradigm and the diverse debates surrounding its use in 
the academic, political, policy, and security spheres. The article affirms 
that states labelled as failed display a number of pathologies which 
have a major detrimental effect on the well-being of their peoples and 
on international security. Despite this, the securitization of failed states 
in political as well as academic discourse depicts a subjectively West-
ern-driven development of international security. This has a range of 
consequences for political security. In contradistinction, this article 
identifies an important difference between the notion of a failed state, 
as epitomized in political and academic discourses, and the realities of 
state failure, which are wildly disputed. Thus, the subjective interpre-
tation and construction of a threat and a challenge can and does have a 
significant material impact on funding, over legitimacy of the conver-
sation, diplomatic focus, and, most probably, even military interven-
tion.
The securitization of such states strengthens the tendency to exter-
nalize threats in the southern hemisphere or even to demonize the 
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Global South as an excuse for domination and intervention. The result 
here is a lack of understanding and respect for the difficulties and 
problems existing elsewhere. Furthermore, there is a failure to appreci-
ate the idea that such obstacles are to an extent the result of patholo-
gies intrinsic to the international system.
That is not to say that the label of failed state, with all its complexi-
ties and problems, should be abandoned. Given that this approach 
has gained in popularity over the years, it suggests a genuine need 
to contemplate more deeply the nature of international political and 
security issues. Researchers who focus on security policy should re-
evaluate and question some of the fundamental assumptions of their 
work with regard to the forces as well as the ontologies of politics 
and security from an international perspective. A critical approach to 
defining and measuring such states is required. Conventional methods 
have to develop and become more nuanced and distinguished in their 
understanding of such states so as to establish a more credible and less 
politically prejudiced empirical examination as part of this approach.
Consecutively, conceptually critical concepts that seem to disap-
prove of this approach out of hand, as an ambiguous hegemonic 
method, should attempt to engage more with this approach and make 
more of an effort to go beyond the failure-or-success binary think-
ing that is suggested by the failed-state approach. Collectively, more 
innovative concepts may assist in broadening the understanding of the 
nature of international security and politics, and possibly help to cre-
ate policies that address the epochal obstacles faced by the most brittle 
states.
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